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CORPORATE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND 
THE SEC. By Nicholas Wolfson.1 Westport, Conn.: Quo-
rum Books. 1990. Pp. vi, 178. Cloth, $42.95. 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE AMERICAN 
MILITARY: A COMMUNICATION MODELING ANAL· 
YSIS. By Cathy Packer.2 New York, N.Y.: Praeger Publish-
ers. 1989. Pp. xii, 268. Cloth, $47.95. 
John M. Rogers 3 
The Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea set out to prove that you 
can't move from point A to point B. First you have to get to the 
half-way point between A and B. Let's call that point Al. Then 
you have to get to the half-way point between Al and B, which we 
can call A2. Then you have to get to the half-way point between A2 
and B, or A3. And so on. An infinite number of movements are 
necessary before you ever arrive at B, and so you can never get to B. 
The problem is that people get to B all the time. Some scholarly 
discussions of free speech issues, including the books under review, 
suffer from the equivalent of this weakness in Zeno's reasoning. 
I 
Nicholas Wolfson has set out to demonstrate that the federal 
securities laws regulate speech that cannot be distinguished from 
speech fully protected by the first amendment. The problem is that 
most of us would agree that some speech is not entitled to "full" 
first amendment protection. How do we get there without either 
using distinctions that Wolfson says won't work, or identifying 
some other distinction that he has neglected? Thus, Wolfson's ar-
gument has a Zeno-like flavor. In this sense his argument is unsatis-
fying, although otherwise challenging, perceptive, and carefully 
analytical. 
Under the federal securities statutes, the SEC regulates what 
corporations may say when they solicit proxies, what hostile bidders 
must disclose during takeovers, and what securities issuers must put 
in prospectuses. The SEC also licenses the giving of investment ad-
vice. There is no defensible way to distinguish these regulations of 
I. Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. 
2. Assistant Professor, School of Journalism, University of Nonh Carolina at Chapel 
Hill. 
3. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. 
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speech, according to Wolfson, from regulation of the content of 
newspapers or political speeches. 
In his first chapter, Wolfson examines the case law dealing 
with commercial speech in general. Many of the Supreme Court 
cases deal with advertising, which in recent decades has been given 
a modicum of first amendment protection as "commercial speech," 
though less than that accorded "noncommercial speech." Chapter 
two involves "SEC speech" in particular. Three Supreme Court 
justices relied upon the first amendment to support a decision that 
the SEC could not stop unregistered investment advisers from pub-
lication of advice in securities newsletters. Two circuits have ex-
amined whether the SEC can regulate corporate press releases or 
newspaper advertisements intended to influence proxy contests or 
stock purchases. 
In the next two chapters, Wolfson evaluates the positions of 
various scholars regarding the lesser first amendment protection 
given to commercial speech. These include Martin Redish, C. Ed-
win Baker, Thomas Jackson and John Jeffries, Frederick Schauer, 
Vincent Blasi, Steven Shiffrin, Laurence Tribe, Aaron Director, 
Ronald Coase, Richard Posner, Fred S. McChesney, and George J. 
Bentson. The final chapter, previously published in part as a law 
review article, sets forth affirmatively Wolfson's position that "[t]he 
federal securities laws regulate speech that is impossible to mean-
ingfully distinguish from speech that all of us would concede should 
receive the full protection of the First Amendment." 
Wolfson first identifies the most generally accepted underlying 
purposes of the first amendment. One is to aid the political process. 
Certainly our political system assumes that ideas can be freely ex-
changed. Another purpose is to facilitate the search for truth. The 
idea is that truth may best be arrived at by the free competition of 
ideas. Finally, the first amendment may also be supported by the 
intrinsic value to individual human beings to express themselves 
and to hear others. Each of these purposes, according to Wolfson, 
supports freedom to advertise a product for sale as much as it sup-
ports freedom to express oneself in other ways. 
The first amendment freedom of expression furthers the demo-
cratic process, but unless we accept Robert Bork's now-discredited 
article in the Indiana Law Journal, the first amendment cannot be 
limited to campaign speech. In any event, a lot of campaign speech 
is economically self-interested and therefore indistinguishable from 
advertising. 
The search for truth may also be furthered as much by business 
advertising as by political or artistic expression, according to Wolf-
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son. He rejects the often-cited rationale that business advertising is 
hardier and more resistant to suppression than political or artistic 
speech. Among his arguments are that political speech often re-
flects economic interests and is therefore robust. Moreover, "[i]t is 
commonplace to contrast the courage of the ideologue to the timid-
ity of the businessman." Wolfson also rather easily disposes of the 
argument that the content of advertisements is more easily verifiable 
than the content of political speech. Some advertisements are obvi-
ously difficult to verify (e.g., "our shampoo will beautify your 
hair"), while some political speech can be verified or disproved eas-
ily (e.g., "The Holocaust did not occur."). 
Finally, business advertising involves personal fulfillment, and 
often contains artistic and cultural expression, while some speech 
that is fully protected by the first amendment, such as a book prais-
ing one's product, may be just as economically self-interested as any 
advertisement. 
All of this presents a cogent argument for protecting advertis-
ing expression as fully as political or artistic expression. 4 Still, full 
first amendment protection for business advertising is not the same 
thing as full first amendment protection for all of the expression 
that the SEC regulates. A proxy solicitation is not an advertise-
ment. In this regard, Wolfson reasons as follows: The primary jus-
tification for not applying the full protection of the first amendment 
to SEC speech is that it is commercial speech. The distinction 
doesn't even work for business advertising. Since business advertis-
ing presumably deserves full protection, SEC speech certainly does 
so-it is closer to political and artistic speech than is advertising, 
and therefore more deserving of protection. 
The problem with this analysis is that we know that some 
kinds of conduct having expressive content may be regulated. Driv-
ing fast on the highway may, for instance, be expressive. If we start 
with an activity that is clearly not subject to full first amendment 
scrutiny, and extend this to find an expanding number of other 
types of conduct to be indistinguishable, we may ultimately reach 
SEC speech, and from SEC speech onwards to unprotected activi-
4. One response might be that the harms resulting from failure to regulate advertising 
are different in nature from the harms resulting from nonregulation of political or artistic 
expression. Such an argument does not necessarily undermine the persuasiveness of Wolf-
son's argument, however. The dangers of political and social upheaval resulting from limits 
on the ability of government to control political and artistic expression are perhaps no less 
than the dangers of consumer fraud. In addition, the danger of social upheaval may indeed 
be lessened in the long run by a wide freedom of expression. But the danger of consumer 
fraud might similarly be actually lessened by limiting government control of advertising. 
Consumers would have the advantage of vigorous counteradvertising, and they might also 
generally rely less on the accuracy of fully unregulated advertising. 
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ties. If such a progression is tenable, then the Constitution, in order 
to avoid a contradiction, can only be interpreted to require that a 
rough line be drawn. It is therefore not enough to say merely that 
SEC speech is indistinguishable from some speech that is fully pro-
tected. Wolfson must also distinguish SEC speech from conduct 
that is clearly not. Such a distinction may not be easy. 
Surely, for instance, the government can regulate how a corpo-
ration is formed or governed. When people organize themselves 
into corporations, they do so to take advantage of benefits (such as 
limited liability) that are granted by the law. It is hard to imagine 
that the Constitution prohibits conditions from being imposed upon 
the structure of organizations that obtain such benefits. But much 
of the activity of putting together or governing any organization is 
communicative. The idea that corporate structure can be regulated 
thus suggests that expression can be regulated. Clear examples 
would be notice requirements for shareholder meetings, and voting 
requirements for shareholders. It is only a small step to say that the 
state can regulate what must be in a prospectus, or what must be in 
proxy solicitations. If the state can do this, moreover, without vio-
lating the first amendment, surely the federal government can do so 
as well. 
Wolfson rejects the argument that modem corporate structure 
is by its nature particularly coercive or dangerous, but rejecting 
such an argument is a far cry from saying corporate structure can-
not be regulated. Wolfson suggests a couple of times that he is re-
ally talking about freedom of association rather than freedom of 
expression. The implication is that the first amendment limits the 
regulation of corporate structure. He even says that the only differ-
ence between a corporation and a political party is the indefensible 
one that the corporation is commercial. But a political party needs 
no statutory authority to form; a corporation does.s 
Most recently, the Supreme Court has cut back even on the 
first amendment rights of corporations with respect to political 
campaign contributions. The rationale for upholding a Michigan 
statute limiting campaign contributions by a nonprofit corporation 
was that: 
State law grants corporations special advantages-such as lim-
ited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the ac-
cumulation and distribution of assets-that enhance their ability 
5. Certainly the Supreme Court has not indicated that our Constitution guarantees the 
benefits of corporate status to people who organize themselves any which way, though the 
first amendment has recently and logically been held to protect the ability of political parties 
to decide how to organize. 
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to attract capital and to deploy their resources in ways that maxi-
mize the return on their shareholders' investments. 
. . . Michigan's regulation aims at . . . the corrosive and 
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are ac-
cumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have 
little or no correlation to the public's support for the corpora-
tion's political ideas. 6 
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While this rationale is subject to criticism (three justices dis-
sented vigorously) where political campaigns are concerned, the ar-
gument certainly has great force where corporate governance is 
involved. Austin thus fundamentally undermines Wolfson's argu-
ment. He seems to realize this, but doesn't really have an answer, 
beyond the points made in dissent in that case. 
Justice Scalia's dissent, for instance, argued that noncorporate 
groups and individuals are given state advantages ranging from tax 
breaks to cash subsidies, but that a state cannot condition such fa-
vors on loss of the first amendment protection. At some point, 
though, such an argument breaks down. The government, for in-
stance, can certainly pay a publicity company to advertise in favor 
of Armed Forces recruitment, and condition such payment on 
speaking in favor of, rather than against, enlisting in the Army. 
The reason must be that there is a close relationship between the 
government benefit and the limitation on expression. 1 There is 
room for argument about the directness of the relationship between 
the benefits of corporate status and limits on campaign contribu-
tions, but much less room to question the relationship between the 
benefits of corporate status and the rules of corporate governance. s 
6. Austin v. Michigan ChamberofCommerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1397 (1990). 
7. Stated differently, the government can sometimes "buy" the waiver of a constitu-
tional right. While this sounds harsh in the abstract, it happens all the time when the waiver 
and the "purchase" are very closely connected. See, most recently, Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. 
Ct. 1759, 1771-76 (1991). If an American has the right to go where he or she pleases, and not 
be confined for a long period of time without due process of law, the government can cer-
tainly hire the same American to sit, for instance, in a guardhouse or at a desk for eight hours 
a day, fifty weeks per year. As long as the paycheck keeps getting cashed, the government 
can demand such "confinement," if that "confinement" is an integral part of what is being 
paid for. We can argue about whether this is the wisest use of the employee, but it doesn't 
help the argument too much to talk about not depriving the person of liberty without due 
process of law. Of course if the employee is not desk bound as part of the job, but rather as a 
punishment for dishonesty, due process considerations come back into play. But the first 
question is whether the very terms of employment involve the "confinement." 
8. Take a statutory requirement that shareholders receive notice of shareholder meet-
ings, for example. Corporate status facilitates coherent pooling of resources, and the result-
ing social good arguably outweighs society's interest in insuring that individuals have more 
direct control over how their resources are used. The requirement of notice for shareholder 
meetings puts a minor limit on the ability of economic interests to act coherently. The limit is 
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Once the constitutionality of government regulation of corpo-
rate governance is established, it must still be asked whether the 
kinds of regulation that the SEC engages in are similarly justified as 
a condition for governmental benefits. The SEC regulates not only 
corporations, but also other types of entities that issue securities, 
though most are statutory creations of one sort or another. Perhaps 
SEC regulation is not sufficiently related to the benefits that the 
government gives to the largely-corporate participants in the invest-
ment market. The issue is of course distinct from the issue of 
whether such rules are wise. 
The key inquiry is whether the control of speech inherent in 
SEC regulation can be seen as part of the bargain in permitting indi-
viduals to organize themselves to attract investment in certain prof-
itable ways. The answer may be yes or no, but it does not dispose of 
the question just to demonstrate that the speech is indistinguishable 
from fully protected speech in terms of its nature, purpose, or effect. 
In short, if any part of corporation law is free of first amendment 
inquiry, then Wolfson has not distinguished it from the "SEC 
speech" that he says should be protected by the first amendment. 
II 
Cathy Packer's argument on free speech and the military is 
similar to Wolfson's in many ways. She attacks the present Court's 
standards for reviewing restrictions on military speech, taking aim 
at the grounds most often asserted for distinguishing military 
speech from civilian speech for first amendment purposes. Her ulti-
mate claim, however, is considerably less radical than Wolfson's. It 
is not that there should be no distinction, but that under the first 
amendment there should be "greater tolerance of servicemembers' 
expressive activities" than there is now. She doesn't take a position 
on how much greater that tolerance should be. 
Packer starts with a summary history of the development of 
theories of communication. Various models of how communication 
works have been developed since World War I, reflecting the in-
creased recognition of such factors as listener selectivity, feedback, 
psychological framework of the sender and receiver, "noise," 
agenda-setting, and so on. After reviewing two dozen models, each 
accompanied by a computer-graphic illustration, Packer sets forth 
her own summary model, emphasizing that communication is "a 
continuous process that works differently in different contexts and 
directly related to the benefit that those interests enjoy because the limit serves to protect the 
very interest compromised by the statute-the social good that results from individuals" hav-
ing more direct control over the use of their resources. 
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when communicators have different communications skills," and 
also that "communication has an unpredictable variety of purposes 
and effects, or it may have no effect at all." 
Packer then surveys the literature on communication in the 
military, including S.L.A. Marshall's comments on the lack of clear 
commanding voices on the battlefield during World War II, varying 
views on how well enlisted persons' thinking is heard in the officer 
ranks, arguments that the development of sophisticated new weap-
ons requires greater discussion and individual responsibility among 
servicemembers, and published discussions of the effect of dissent in 
the ranks during the Vietnam War. 
She next surveys law journal articles and other scholarly opin-
ion on such issues as whether the Bill of Rights should be applied to 
the military, how the first amendment should apply to soldiers, and 
whether particular articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
are unconstitutional. Her fourth survey covers the military justice 
system in general, including a section on civilian court jurisdiction 
over military cases. She relies for the most part upon sometimes 
dated secondary authority; this is the apparent cause of her omit-
ting to mention the 1983 statutory provision for Supreme Court re-
view of Court of Military Appeals decisions. 9 
Next is a survey of cases: military court cases from 1951 to 
1964 affirming convictions for expressive activity, later Supreme 
Court cases involving protest against the Vietnam War, and various 
federal cases involving limits on servicemember speech. The two 
key Supreme Court cases were Parker v. Levy,w upholding the 
court martial conviction of an Army doctor for counselling black 
soldiers not to go to Vietnam, and Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech,tt 
upholding the court martial of a private in Vietnam who gave a 
typed statement critical of the war to a military mimeograph opera-
tor to have copies made. 
Packer's final survey is of varying views about four post-Viet-
nam first amendment problems involving the military: are unions 
compatible with the military? may soldiers participate in extremist 
group activity? can the political speech of generals be silenced? to 
what extent can commanders keep their soldiers from circulating 
petitions? 
With all the "literature" laid out, Packer applies it in her final 
chapter to ascertain the "model" accepted by courts as descriptive 
9. Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1393, 1405 (1983) codified at 
28 u.s.c. § 1259 (1988). 
10. 417 U.S. 733 (1974). 
II. 418 U.S. 676 (1974). 
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of military communication. The model's flaws of course demon-
strate that the courts' conclusions are defective. She contrasts the 
model with the overall communication model described in her first 
survey. A more accurate military communication model would 
lead presumably to wiser court judgments, though Packer barely 
suggests what those judgments should be. She merely sets forth a 
more descriptive model. This is the employment of social science 
jargon to engage in legal criticism. 
She first lists the characteristics of the "separate military soci-
ety" (the phrase is from Parker v. Levy) assumed in the case law: 
(1) the military has the unique mission of waging war 
successfully, 
(2) because of the threat of war, the military does not have time 
to allow the marketplace of ideas to work, 
(3) instant and unquestioning obedience is both possible and 
necessary to the military mission, 
(4) soldiers are motivated to risk their lives because they are 
trained to obey orders and are instilled with loyalty to their 
country and commanders, and 
(5) there is effective two-way communication through official 
military channels. 
Packer criticizes each of these "characteristics" seriatim, though 
not always persuasively.12 
Packer next lists four legal rationales for abridging the first 
amendment rights of military personnel: 
(1) the military must remain politically neutral, 
12. Sometimes the characterization of the military is relatively accurate, but the criti-
cism is weak. For instance, it is true that courts refer to the military's unique mission of 
waging war successfully; Packer's only vaguely critical comment is that large percentages of 
our forces perform service and support functions where the attitude of the enlisted person 
toward war is "of marginal importance." 
Other times the characteristic is in the nature of a straw man. For instance, the third 
characteristic suggests that the discipline furthered by limits on expression involves "absolute 
obedience" and "shouting orders to be instantly obeyed." Packer cites various authorities for 
the propositions that new weapons systems make individual initiative more important, that 
reliance by modem armies upon small units requires training that emphasizes tactical flexibil-
ity and initiative, and that absolute obedience on the part of all members of the armed forces 
is impossible. The implication is that "[s]trict discipline during training may fail to instill in 
soldiers the initiative and decision-making skills needed in small combat units." This is sim-
ply playing with the meaning of the word "discipline." It is a caricature of the concept to 
describe discipline only as unthinking compliance with detailed orders. If the ordered mis-
sion requires initiative and independent decision-making, then ready compliance with orders 
to undertake such a mission-reflecting the highest discipline--demands such initiative and 
independence. It is therefore nonsense to juxtapose discipline and initiative as opposites. It is 
probably even more important to have discipline, properly understood, when small units are 
required to react to new situations without detailed instructions from higher up. 
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(2) loyalty and morale must be maintained at a high level in 
order for soldiers to fight effectively, 
(3) strict order, discipline, and obedience must be maintained if 
a military force is to act promptly and efficiently, and 
(4) the appearance to foreign countries of dissension in the 
ranks of the U.S. armed forces should be avoided. 
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Now for the big jump. "Implicit in those rationales" are four 
assumptions: 
(1) communication is a discrete, linear process that can be 
stopped, 
(2) the purpose of communication usually is persuasive, 
(3) communication has powerful, direct, and predictable ef-
fects, and 
(4) the communication process works the same way regardless 
of who is communicating and regardless of the context in 
which the communication process occurs. 
To read these assumptions into the arguments listed requires a lot of 
stretching. For instance, a conviction of a former POW in North 
Korea for expressing support for the North Koreans in speeches, 
groups, and classes while a POW was upheld with a judicial com-
ment that the speech could be used to help the enemy. This and 
other cases show that the courts find such speech to be "powerfully 
persuasive." Certainly speech can persuade, or at least potentially 
persuade, without our assuming that the purpose of the speech was 
persuasive, or that all of the effects are direct and predictable. Yet 
when Packer subsequently criticizes the list of assumptions, the 
context for arriving at them is lacking, and they can be criticized as 
being simplistic. "[T]he purpose of communication is frequently 
not persuasion and ... receivers as well as senders have multiple 
motives." Communication has "a wide range of effects" that may 
be "direct or indirect, short- or long-term, cumulative or noncumu-
lative." It is hard to see how these insights undermine court deci-
sions upholding punishment for speech in aid of the enemy, or for 
speech encouraging disaffection or disobedience. 
Even more than in the case of corporate regulation, it is clear 
that the military can control the speech of servicemembers. "Tell 
your subordinates to prepare to attack at dawn," or "establish liai-
son with foreign unit X" are obvious examples of control of the 
expression of soldiers. It should be obvious that such control is nec-
essary, and that failure to comply should be punishable by court 
martial. It would be absurd to interpret the first amendment to the 
contrary. As in the case of government control of corporate struc-
ture, the very government undertaking assumes some control over 
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expression, control that would not be permitted if the expression 
were that of a private citizen. Such control is a condition of 
service.n 
Again, this is not to suggest that the government can control 
military speech completely. At some point the connection between 
the military endeavor on the one hand and a soldier's expression on 
the other becomes too attenuated. Where that point lies seems a 
question best answered initially by the military, subject ultimately 
to court review. Military leaders like to get the job done, and the 
value of communication is forced upon those who don't already ap-
preciate it. Military leaders also know a lot about the nature of 
discipline; martinets shouting orders went out of style long ago. 
Doubtless the interest in free expression by soldiers is not weighed 
as accurately by the military as it is by the courts, but it is just as 
likely that a court will not weigh the military's interest in discipline 
as accurately as the military will. It therefore makes sense for the 
courts generally to defer to the military in evaluating that interest. 
Certainly an across-the-board increase in the amount of court intru-
sion into the military communication structure requires far more 
justification than Packer has presented. 
TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFES-
SOR'S YEAR ON THE STREETS WITH THE NEW 
YORK CITY POLICE. By H. Richard Uviller.1 Chicago: 
Contemporary Books. 1988. Pp. xix, 234. Cloth, $19.95. 
David Dolinko 2 
Appellate judges and legal academics too often lack firsthand 
acquaintance with the front-line realities of the criminal justice sys-
tem. Fearing that his own exposure to those realities as a young 
prosecutor had grown stale during fourteen years teaching law, Pro-
fessor H. Richard Uviller spent eight months of a recent sabbatical 
"hanging out with" and observing police in the crime-ridden Ninth 
Precinct of New York City. The book that resulted should interest 
13. While service is not always voluntary, everyone recognizes that military service in· 
valves at least the kinds of loss of freedom that are incident to voluntary employment. If a 
drafted soldier has the freedom to flout orders, then it doesn't make much sense to have a 
draft at all. Maybe the draft is unwise or unconstitutional, but surely such a conclusion is not 
required simply by the freedom of expression principles of the first amendment. 
I. Professor of Law, Columbia University. 
2. Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. 
